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Abstract
This paper receives its impetus from Gadamer's account of
effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte) and his corresponding
challenge to the 'problem of purity' that he locates in Kant's
critique of aesthetic judgment and that derives from the
attempt to establish universal founding principles for thought
and action. This is a deep and wide-ranging issue, and so I
focus on a very specific aspect of it: the division between
intuition and understanding, between history as a given flux
and enlightenment as a unifying synthesis, that motivates
Kant's search for pure reflective grounds to reconcile them,
and on the challenge posed to this division by the version of
history as prejudice that Gadamer describes. My aim is to
make salient key markers in the 'history v purity' problem,
through a dialogue between two themes (pré-jugé and avant-
garde) that continue to pervade the problem and three figures
(Kant, Gadamer and Lyotard) who partially see the problem
but do not succeed in getting beyond it.
Key Words
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1. Out with the Old Problem; In with the New
Common to the concepts of 'avant-garde' and 'pré-jugé' is the
idea of something before, something previous, something
prior.[1] According to Gadamer's account of 'effective history,'
judgments are not pure but prejudiced, that is, made and
implemented within a framework of pre-given purposes that
are not themselves, at that moment, freely chosen or subject
to reflective consideration. Before we come to weigh up our
choices in an explicit and apparently rational manner, we have
already been directed in our range of choices and in the
purposes that will determine their fate. We have already
judged before coming to make a judgment. We are pré-
jugé.[2] Being pré-jugé, is, thus, in a certain sense, very like
being avant-garde. Lyotard, for instance, holds that our
judgments are always subject to choices and decisions that
are made prior to the application of fixed rules, avant-garde,
on the basis of a feeling that is subject to conditions of
legitimacy other than those that determine the judgments of
science. To judge avant-garde is to judge before certain formal
criteria are in place, to judge without knowing how to judge as
it were, effectively to pre-judge.[3]
This opening up of understanding to an experience that comes
before the rules of reason apply immediately reveals both
Gadamer and Lyotard as radical critics of certain Kantian
divisions: of intuition and understanding on the one hand, and
of thought and feeling on the other. Kant's division between
intuition and understanding generates a conception of history
as, at once, an almost totally unpredictable flux and a
synthesizing, unifying invariance. The task of reconciling these
two modes of history, the intuitions that are given to us with
the categories that we give to ourselves, becomes his central
problem. It is not possible that the reconciliation between flux
and invariance be thought out, or known, or reasoned. . . .All
of this would require the application of categories and would
achieve unity at the expense of flux by privileging one side of
the divide. And yet, to achieve flux at the expense of unity
would be to put paid to any dreams of reason and
enlightenment that Kant enjoyed: understanding would always
then be at the mercy of intuition and our knowledge always
subject to change of the most unpredictable and disruptive
kind. Hence Kant's delineation of the faculty of pure reflective
judgment in the third critique, a faculty dependent neither on
the content of our intuitions on the one side nor on the
categories of thought on the other, a faculty subject neither to
flux nor to absolute invariance, a faculty based on feeling and
not on cognition, and equipped with a 'pure' foundational
principle; loose enough to provide for the diversity implied by
history as flux and yet sufficiently universal and necessary to
guarantee that history never threatens the unifying force and
extension of our understanding.
Though Kant outlines this faculty for pure reflective judgment
in his aesthetic of feeling, nevertheless it is clear that it is
intended, first and foremost, as a guarantee for the continued
coherence of his science of thought, whose traditional divide
between pure empirical research and abstract theoretical
reasoning, between 'external' unpredictable history and
internal categorical history, yields the divide between
understanding and intuition in the first place. It is from
science, above all, that the pure, unprejudiced, disinterested
aesthetic feeling derives its importance. However, with their
rejuvenation of effective history and of judgment avant-garde
or pré-jugé, Gadamer and Lyotard show both that even
science is subject to judgments that are prior to its alleged
purity (it relies on certain narrative constructions that are not
themselves subject to scientific criteria, Lyotard says[4]) and
that there are domains of thought and practice (Gadamer
labels these loosely as 'the human sciences'[5]) for which the
alleged purity of scientific judgments is inappropriate. Both
appeal to a level of experience more basic than science and in
the context of which the claims of science, and the capacity for
aesthetic feeling that Kant designed in their support, are
subject to pre-judgments rather than pure judgments.
For their critique of Enlightenment to be most effective,
however, Gadamer and Lyotard locate its germs at the heart of
the very tradition that would vehemently deny its worth: in the
capacity for pure, disinterested reflection that lies at the core
of Kant's critical system in his critique of aesthetic judgment.
According to both Gadamer and Lyotard, even within Kant's
own account, there is described the outline of a model for
understanding that does not accord with the rational criteria
that have formed the greater part of his philosophical bequest.
To take on board the basic components of this alternative
model and fully tease out its details and implications for a
philosophical tradition so convinced by the demands of reason
would be, at one and the same time, to question the dominant
Kantian rendition of reason as opposed to prejudice[6] and to
ground that questioning in the very account of aesthetic
judgment that Kant himself describes, though Kant uses it to
secure the capacity for pure reason that Gadamer and Lyotard
use it to undermine. What could be more effective as a model
for effective historical understanding than one derived from
the heart of the philosophical tradition it is directed against?
Hence, my starting point is the rejection of the Kantian
problem of establishing universal and necessary foundations of
thought, which Gadamer and Lyotard demonstrate by using
the judgments that we make on art as exemplary of a kind of
historically embedded understanding for which it is not
possible to establish ahistorical foundations but only shifting
standards and historical conditions. Rejecting the 'problem' of
universal and necessary foundations does, however, give rise
to a related different problem: no longer how to guarantee the
purity of our truth claims, but how to guarantee their
possibility, how to accommodate the possibility of truth claims
and practices within a framework of contextual conditions and
always-underdetermined legitimacy. How, having taken
aesthetic judgment as our paradigm of historically effected
understanding, can we reconcile the radically contingent
nature of our judgments on art with the broad-sweeping
validity which we accord those judgments and that produces
our canons of great writers, our museums of classic artists, our
compilations of 'greatest hits,' and so on? How, in other words,
can we account at one and the same time for the fact that we
are both within history and yet not totally constrained by any
single version of it?
Not only does the dissolution of our first problem yield a
deeply puzzling second problem, however, it also robs us of
the traditional manner of solving deep problems
philosophically, which is to establish a set of founding
premises, deduce therefrom a number of possibilities,
reconcile these with the facts of the case, and produce an
ideally stable solution. For the very possibility of determining
foundations and of producing solutions (in any neutral,
uninvolved fashion) is no longer held to obtain. And so the
puzzle must be propelled forward very differently, on the back
of a number of approaches to the problem of history and
judgment, all of which 'see' the puzzle to some extent but, as
I show, fail in different ways to move it beyond a residual
loyalty to the Kantian, foundationalist tradition from which the
puzzle emerges. In the absence now of firm foundations for
our inquiries, it is to this kind of debate that we can turn for
the partial illumination of our darker puzzles; we do not
advertise it as entirely sufficient but use it to establish certain
links between relevant conceptual histories and construct the
larger problem of which they partake without presuming to
identify its solution.
As for this particular partial illumination, it aims first at
isolating the relevant features of Gadamer's and Lyotard's
shared appropriation of the Kantian aesthetic to oppose the
marginalization of aesthetic judgment with which it has
traditionally been associated. Since their respective readings of
Kant's third critique, upon which they base their appropriations
and subsequent revisions, are by no means uncontentious in
themselves, however, they will require some detailed
discussion here in order to next draw out the dangers of an
even radical rereading of Kant's account of art, by highlighting
the still very Kantian presuppositions of purity that underlie
Lyotard's version of the sublime, and then to locate the
tension that exists between Gadamer's commitment to history
as prejudice and the residual elements of history-as-purity
that linger on in his version of aesthetic taste. All this in order,
finally, to identify the persistence of the Kantian division
between intuition and understanding, between flux and
invariance, even within Lyotard's and Gadamer's explicit
rejection of this division, and to conclude both with a greater
sense of the complexities and risks that accompany the
problem of history and truth and with the beginnings of a
demonstration that such complexities and risks might be more
successfully overcome.
2. Gadamer and Lyotard: Co-opting the Kantian
Aesthetic
As a function of their rejection of the Kantian 'problem of
purity' and its over-emphasis on scientific reason, both
Gadamer and Lyotard disrupt the account of art that Kant used
to support his science by opposing both the marginal role to
which art is assigned in the Kantian tradition and the kind of
art favored by that tradition because it feeds into its own
marginalization.
Though Kant devotes an entire half of an entire third of his
critical system to explicating the conditions and legitimacy of
aesthetic judgment - it does, after all, provide him with an
account of reflection in its 'purest' and therefore most
innovative and enlightening form - he is careful also to insist
on the utterly subjective character of the claims that we make
in this domain; careful, in other words, to ensure that
judgments based purely on feeling never count as knowledge
and therefore never disrupt the purposes and certainties of
science. For Kant, the kind of art that best exemplifies the
aesthetic is to be found on carpets and wallpaper in those
ornamental and repetitive patterns that serve no function but
to be beautiful and have no purpose but to be purposeless.[7]
It is then no surprise that art, for Kant and his descendants, is
regarded as 'merely' art, as a superfluous activity to be
pursued only in fun and judged only in play. Art is a game and
not to be taken seriously. Hence, in the preface to Critique of
Pure Reason, though Kant begins by admitting that a rigorous
epistemology must proceed by discursiveness and intuition (by
which in this instance he means aesthetic judgment), he is
careful to privilege the former logical means over the latter
aesthetic ones, even going so far as to complain that the
clarity and distinctness guaranteed by the use of our logical
powers is often impeded by too persistent an appeal to
illustrative examples and other such aesthetic aids.[8] Thus,
aesthetic judgment, for Kant and the tradition that follows
him, is a decidedly secondary concern.
Having undermined the claims to absolute authority over the
field of knowledge that a Kantian pure reason had assumed,
both Gadamer and Lyotard call into question the attendant
designation of art as secondary and superfluous. In the
manner of questioning the presuppositions of traditions from
within that is typical of his hermeneutical approach, Gadamer
continues to characterize art as a game, but now analyzes the
nature of play as paradigmatic of the nature of understanding
generally: play, though it is ultimately purposeless in that its
goal is not an external one, is at the same time determined by
very specific rules and goals that put paid to the Kantian
tendency to oppose the game of art to the rule-driven rigour
of a scientific reason; in play, also, there is a crucial sense in
which the game both pre-exists and also requires our
participation therein that makes it both larger than us and
therefore 'given' at any one time, and yet also subject to the
changes wrought by our own particular way of playing and
therefore open to a level of reflective activity which it does not
absolutely determine.[9] Thus, the game of art, in Gadamer's
view, demonstrates the activity of play in a broader sense that
has relevance for understanding generally, in which it is not a
matter of purely subjective feeling because a game or play
consists of rules and aims that carry all the weight of an
'object' in the world for us, and yet also not the case that we
remain hopelessly determined by a pre-existing tradition
because it requires our particular participation to make a play
happen at all.
Lyotard, from a slightly different angle, also undermines the
Kantian denigration of art as essentially purposeless and
thereby absolved of the responsibilities that attach to the
purposive practices within science and the moral. In The
Postmodern Condition, by highlighting the scientifically
impossible requirement that science would establish the
grounds for its own legitimacy, Lyotard claims to have
identified the founding story or 'narrative' of science and
thereby undercut the tendency of science to dismiss as 'mere
storytelling' the kinds of narrative that are subject to aesthetic
and not scientific criteria. Science itself rests ultimately on
criteria that can be legitimized 'only' aesthetically, as a
convincing story whose validity relies on its aesthetic
appeal;[10] and the fact that science disguises its narrative
origins as compelling scientific grounds and thereby negates,
from the outset, the pretensions to knowledge of other
worldviews by designating them as 'mere stories,' makes
science into the terrorizing 'metanarrative'[11] that Lyotard
describes. Hence, both Gadamer and Lyotard actually use the
Kantian rendition of art as 'mere' play or 'only a story' in order
to undercut the privilege that a science that denies its
'aesthetic' origins would claim for itself.
Not only, however, do Gadamer and Lyotard oppose the
marginalization of art by a scientistic tradition; as part of the
process they also call into question the type of art that that
tradition elevates in order thus to denigrate: the 'purely'
ornamental art that Kant describes and the purely
'representational' art that the ensuing tradition most values. Of
course, Kant was concerned mostly with the beautiful in nature
and not, primarily, with art (precisely because art is designed
to be beautiful and is never, to that extent, purposeless),[12]
but this preference is ultimately explainable in terms of Kant's
critique of teleological judgment and his proof for the existence
of God. Hence, as the Romantics realized, any account of
aesthetic judgment that wishes to distance itself from theology
must take the beautiful in art and not in nature as its
exemplar. When he does come to art, however, Kant opts for
wallpaper designs as his paradigm; they are closest to nature
in exhibiting almost nothing in the way of purpose or function
above and beyond simply being beautiful.[13]
But as Gadamer points out, this is a very poor starting point
for an account of the aesthetic, as it excludes almost anything
that we would count as art (sculpture, poetry, architecture,
music, etc), all of which is implicated, whether by reference to
events, feelings, other styles or periods, certain functions and
so on, in purposes other than being merely beautiful.[14] And,
though the Enlightenment tradition that followed Kant
naturally did not continue to restrict its paradigmatic artworks
to wallpaper designs, the enthusiasm for representational art
that characterizes that tradition still produces too narrow an
account of art and still feeds too readily into the
marginalization of the aesthetic. Representations are to art
effectively as propositions are to science: the object, it is
assumed, is constant and known, and it is simply a matter of
predicating something of that object by making Charles I, for
instance, into the prince that he really is, or the Alps into the
site of awe that they are but are not always seen to be. It is
no surprise, then, that a tradition so intoxicated by the
propositional logic of science should designate as 'beautiful'
only a certain propositional/representational logic in art. But,
of course, art, restricted as it is to a merely figurative or
aesthetic representation of its objects, can only ever
approximate the accuracy and fecundity of science and only
then by being translated into the objective propositional
language that it emulates. And so art-as-representation is
designated as the poor cousin of thought, fun for a while but
never as good as science is at telling us about its objects.
Thus, as Lyotard and Gadamer both show, the notion that
representationalism is the paradigmatic art form is really a
prejudice of the very scientistic tradition which then uses the
second-rate (when measured in terms of propositional logic)
representations of art to justify its second-rate status. In
pursuit of this point, Lyotard devotes considerable time to the
art movements of the second half of the nineteenth century,
from Impressionism to present-day Minimalism, that began to
question, the value of representationalism in art and the
possibilities for aesthetic significance that lie outside of its
stultifying domain. From Manet to Cézanne and Buren and
Duchamp, Lyotard establishes a counter-Enlightenment
aesthetic tradition that combines a self-conscious reflection on
the scientistic presuppositions that determined its restriction to
the representation of objects with a heightened sense of the
possibilities inherent in its materials and techniques when they
are not regarded merely as instruments towards a
representational end.[15] Hence the Impressionist focus on
the brush stroke to denote time, Cézanne's innovative work on
the significance of line and form, Matisse's rehabilitation of
colour, Duchamp's critique of the very activity of production,
and so on. , Lyotard maintains that we owe a much greater
awareness of the restrictions implied by representationalism
and the possibilities for art that are opened up in its wake to
such a counter-tradition.
3. Understanding within History: Experience as Event
Having thus contested the hegemony of scientific reason and
undermined its rendition of art by exposing its implicit agenda,
both Gadamer and Lyotard proceed to redeem from the
experience of aesthetic judgment (now freed from its poor-
cousin status) a model of understanding that will offer a
positive challenge to the dominant, Kantian one. Liberated
from the objectivist yolk privileged by the Enlightenment, this
account of experience does not rely on a subject standing over
against its object and predicating more and more aspects of it
as it gets to know it better and better. Instead, the experience
of understanding that is recuperated by a greater aesthetic
awareness is structured, according to both Gadamer and
Lyotard, as an event, as something that happens to one rather
than something that originates in oneself. It is also at this
point, however, that Gadamer and Lyotard diverge in their
reading of aesthetic experience and their attendant response
to Kantian assumptions about knowledge. This is illustrated
succinctly by the choice of artwork that each makes as
exemplary of the experience of understanding, both in terms
of its content and its form.
The epigraph to Gadamer's Truth and Method is a quotation
from a poem by Rilke:
"Catch only what you've thrown yourself, all is
mere skill and little gain;
but when you're suddenly the catcher of a ball
thrown by an eternal partner
with accurate and measured swing
towards you, to your center, in an arch
from the great bridgebuilding of God:
why then catching becomes a power -
Not yours, a world's."
Gadamer uses the image of catching a ball that is thrown from
elsewhere to communicate the kind of experience that he
holds is exemplified in our judgments on art and applies to the
kind of prejudiced understanding that takes place, within the
human sciences at the very least. This kind of experience is,
he tells us, experience-as-Erfahrung. Erfahrung refers to an
event that one undergoes as one participates in a process that
is larger and more continuous than oneself and in the context
of which one always has a sense that there is much more to
be said than one can communicate in a single sentence or a
single life's work.[16] For a better explanation of this kind of
experience, Gadamer uses an image from Aristotle where the
experience of understanding is rendered as a fleeing army
coming to a stop, and it is impossible to tell at what moment
flight turns to halt and yet possible to say at one point that
the army flees and at another that it stands.[17] Historically
effected understanding is generated when a certain pattern or
repetition emerges as a certain experience, though no single
subjective experience can be identified as responsible for its
emergence. Thus, experience-as-Erfahrung is acquired
unpredictably and yet not out of the blue, for the importance
of repetition in the generation of a pattern of experience
means that the ground is always prepared for understanding
before it actually occurs.[18] It is in this context that Gadamer
rehabilitates the notion of prejudice; because in order to
understand, we must 'log in' to a tradition that lies beyond us;
we are always already directed in certain ways before we come
to reflect, always already judging before we come to make a
judgment.
When Lyotard describes understanding as an event, however,
he has a very different account of event in mind, though, like
Gadamer, he refers us to the content of a particular artwork
as illustration. He points us to a series of paintings by the
artist Barnett Newman entitled Here I, Here II, Here III,
another two entitled Now, and others.[19] In these paintings,
according to Lyotard, Newman explores in an inevitably
barren, minimalist fashion the experience of understanding as
an event in the present, the present as a point in time in itself
and not in relation to the moment just past and the moment
just to come. Lyotard interprets Newman as asking, What does
it mean to experience the present as an event in itself, an
event out of which understanding is composed but which
cannot itself be understood in any determined, compositional
or relative manner? The answer: It means the experience that
something has happened rather than nothing, that in the face
of the possibility of nothing but a blank page words have been
written and in spite of the imminence of silence a note has
been struck. From where? This is what, when one experiences
the present as an event in its own right, one cannot tell. For
that something has happened rather than nothing is like an
inspiration, a message from nowhere, an event from nothing,
a judgment avant-garde. Thus, while both Gadamer and
Lyotard describe understanding as an event that addresses us
from beyond ourselves, for Lyotard this event is instantaneous
and emerges from nowhere, from an 'ahistory' or a
'prehistory,'[20] while for Gadamer it is a process whose roots
lie in the past and whose future stretches ahead. For
Gadamer, understanding is an Erfahrung; for Lyotard, it has
the structure of Erlebnis, a radically finite experience that one
must live, that is, encounter directly and instantaneously.
For both Gadamer and Lyotard, then, Kant remains an
important background figure, though as we have seen they
devote considerable time and effort to undermining key
aspects of Kant's aesthetic. On Gadamer's account, the
exemplary experience of art is processual, in that it has the
structure of an event that is ongoing and in which one
participates for a time and for which one's participation may or
may not effect a more or less radical change in direction and
impetus. Thus at stake in the judgment of art and in
understanding generally is, for Gadamer, the achievement,
however temporarily, of a level of harmony between what is
pre-given and what is added in reflection; between the
historical nature of the object to be understood and the
prejudices of the subject who is to understand; between one's
prejudices and one's judgments. In understanding as
Erfahrung, one participates in a historical event that is larger
than the individual encounter can comprehend; in coming to
an optimal arrangement between the event as a tradition and
the particular encounter with that tradition, if only for a time,
one achieves maximum openness to the divergent
perspectives implied by historical existence. Thus, harmony, or
beauty, operates as a regulative ideal, the negotiation of which
requires a common sense that has a feel for what is generally
(universally?) acceptable without having the concepts or
categories to prove it. Kant's account of taste for the beautiful,
then, remains more or less intact within the framework of
Gadamer's commitment to history, as a means of articulating
our negotiation of the event of understanding as Erfahrung, of
understanding as pré-jugé.
It is to feeling for the sublime, however, that Lyotard applies
in his rendition of the event of understanding as Erlebnis. For
Lyotard, art is not primarily about beauty and harmony but
much more importantly communicates something disruptive of
beauty and harmony. Art interposes as an event into the
steady ebb and flow of expectations, constructions, hypotheses
and accommodations that constitute our knowledge and for
which a sense of taste is eminently suitable. And the content
of this event is not important. For it is only the 'that it
happened' that is significant in this context; the 'what
happened' comes later and is the province of those who would
wallpaper over the primary happenings with comforting
constructions and beautiful forms. Thus it is only the very
minimal combination of pain (at the possibility that nothing will
happen) and pleasure (at the fact that something did) that
amounts to a really authentic experience of the conditions that
make all understanding possible. This contradictory feeling is
feeling for the sublime, to which Kant devotes a very little
space in this account of aesthetic judgment but which Lyotard
emphasizes as the key to aesthetic experience and to
understanding generally.[21]
Their divergent readings of the Kantian aesthetic in answer to
their different accounts of understanding as event produces,
for my purposes, a very significant contrast between Gadamer
and Lyotard because it begins to show what I would draw out
of this debate: An even radically critical rereading of Kant's
aesthetic is not necessarily going to overcome the 'problem of
purity' and the division between flux and invariance that it
purports to address. Although Gadamer and Lyotard share a
similar problem and point towards its similar solution in a
commitment to history and prejudgment, there are crucial
differences between them, ,between being pré-jugé and being
avant-garde. For to be avant-garde, to pre-judge in this
sense, is on Lyotard's account also precisely not to be
prejudiced, precisely not to operate with concepts or
categories, whether rationally or hermeneutically. Like
Gadamer, Lyotard identifies the emphasis on reason and
science that emerged from Kant's rejection of history as a
prejudice that does not pass its own test of purity. But unlike
Gadamer, Lyotard opposes Kantian reason and objectivity
because it is a prejudice per se, and not simply because it is a
prejudice that has advertised itself as and had the influence of
a self-evident and neutral method for deriving truth.
Hence, it is in the name of the Kantian prejudice against
prejudice that Lyotard rejects the modern scientistic tradition
in favor of a model of understanding based on feeling for
particular events rather than knowledge from general rules.
And hence, his notion of avant-garde, though directed in a
manner similar to Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice, is
motivated very differently: it claims it is the product of a 'pure'
and truly unprejudiced feeling rather than an 'impure' and
thoroughly historical context. To be avant-garde is certainly
not to bepré-jugé. To simply oppose the privileging of reason
by privileging the aesthetic, then, is not in itself going to
rehabilitate prejudice and reinstall history as crucial regulators
of meaning. For though founding a model of understanding on
feeling as opposed to knowing will certainly undermine the
hegemony of scientific reason (as Lyotard shows), it will of
itself do nothing to undermine the ideal of purity which it is
Gadamer's declared intention to do. It is as possible for
Lyotard to construe feeling as the source of purity as it was for
the Enlightenment to construe knowing as the source of purity.
And it is in not recognizing this, or not remaining alive to its
implications, that Gadamer's account of effective history is
open to serious objections about the presuppositions of purity
that underlie his own rehabilitation of history and tradition.
There is a crucial difference between being avant-garde
(operating before making a judgment, on the basis of a pure
feeling and without any prejudice at all) and beingpré-jugé
(operating before making a judgment, within a framework of
presuppositions that are not subject to explicit formulation at
that time). To confuse the one with the other, as I now want
to characterize Gadamer as sometimes doing, is to mistake a
stance that is infused with the most important principles of
Enlightenment as the equivalent of an attitude that would
throw those principles open for question.
4. The Lyricist and the Minimalist
Not only does the content of Rilke's poem and Newman's
painting communicate something of the nature of
understanding as an event (either as Erfahrung or Erlebnis),
much more importantly each artwork participates in a form of
aesthetic production that according to Gadamer and Lyotard
respectively is ,uniquely designed to testify to the experience
of understanding that both want to offer as an alternative to
the dominant Enlightenment model. Rilke's poem is a lyric,
and it is to the lyric that Gadamer looks as the exemplary art
form, one that demonstrates the conditions for aesthetic
experience generally and for the model of understanding that
he seeks to derive therefrom; Newman's paintings make part
of a minimalist movement within art that for Lyotard is,
privileged in its access to the truth about art, about aesthetic
judgment, and about the minimal and very ambiguous origins
of understanding in the broader sense. A careful look at the
manner in which both Gadamer and Lyotard employ their
respective paradigmatic art forms, however, is enough to
reveal both the beginnings of a serious tension between
prejudice and truth in Gadamer's work and the kind of deep
puzzle that any rejection of Kant's division between
understanding and intuition in the face of effective history
must confront.
In parallel attempts to appropriate the Kantian aesthetic for
their own counter-Kantian ends, Gadamer and Lyotard outline
their version of aesthetic judgment in a single, seminal essay.
For Gadamer, it is 'The Relevance of the Beautiful';[22] for
Lyotard it is 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde.' In these
essays, Gadamer and Lyotard expound on the features of their
chosen art form that make it eminently suitable as exemplary
of art as a whole and of aesthetic understanding as an
alternative to science. A brief and somewhat schematic look at
the points of contrast and comparison between the lyric (as
Gadamer describes it) and the art of the avant-garde (as
Lyotard describes it) is enough to reveal the tendency in
Gadamer's work to undermine the radically historical aspect of
judgment that ispré-jugé in favor of the Kantian purity that is
promised by judgments that are avant-garde.
The most extreme and thus telling form of the lyric poem,
Gadamer writes in his essay, is exemplified by the kind of
'pure poetry' for which Mallarmé is famed. So the question
now becomes: What are those aspects of the lyric as pure
poetry that are essentially aesthetic and that reveal the
conditions of possibility for the kind of judgment that Gadamer
wants to offer as an alternative to the Kantian model? The first
and most outstanding feature of Mallarmé's pure poems is
their striving for an increasingly complete self-referentiality. In
other words, if one were to look for a model for poetry to
oppose the traditional representationalist model,, this would be
the place to start. Mallarmé believed first and foremost in the
self-sufficiency of literary language as directly opposed to the
instrumentalist attitude to language that prevails where
information and representation is at stake. For him, the
purpose of poetry is not to convey emotional states nor to
manipulate language in carefully crafted ways, but to forge a
separate symbolic reality by means of dense codes and subtle
impressions. Thus, more and more, Mallarmé's pure poems
came to refer not to objects in the world, nor even to their
effects on the mind of the artist, but only to the poems
themselves and to the act of writing itself.
It is not for nothing, however, that Mallarmé is frequently
referred to as an influence on the contemporary avant-garde;
the most important aspect of Newman's paintings, for Lyotard,
is precisely the self-referentiality that Gadamer privileges in
the pure lyric poem. There are, Lyotard explains in 'The
Sublime and the Avant-Garde,' no allusions in Newman's work.
His paintings announce nothing, nothing but themselves. Their
message, he says, 'speaks of nothing.'[23] And it is in their
not referring to anything but themselves that Lyotard locates
these paintings' sublimity; in refusing us the possibility of
formulating interpretations and speculating as to significance,
they compel us to feel very simply and very forcibly that, as a
minimum, this painting exists where nothing might have been,
and that this feeling is the feeling that lies at the heart of all
understanding, which is effectively an attempt to cover over
the feeling and ignore its pressing and troubling reality.
But if the radical self-referentiality that characterizes both
Mallarmé's poems and Newman's paintings is so effective a
testimony to the sublime feeling that understanding comes
from nothing, why is it that Gadamer uses it to communicate
an experience of understanding that comes from tradition? As
illustration of the sublime, and of the very barren feeling that
prior to anything that happens avant-garde there must be a
moment of suspense that nothing might happen at all, Lyotard
finds such art works understandably appropriate, but how is it
that they illustrate Gadamer's account of understanding as
always situated within particular contexts and prejudices and
never subject to the kind of blank-slate nothingness from
which inspiration 'out of nothing' strikes? Is Gadamer's account
of understanding aspré-jugé after all just another version of
understanding as avant-garde, and does he therefore rely, as
Lyotard does, on a version of purity purportedly more basic
than Kant's but also purportedly more basic than the histories
and prejudices wherein Gadamer has claimed to locate
understanding?
The short answer to this question is 'No.' Gadamer's account
of aesthetic judgment aspré-jugé does not amount to
Lyotard's account of aesthetic judgment as avant-garde. And
this turns on the fact that they understand the notion of self-
referentiality very differently. Mallarmé's poetry, in its attempt
to get well and truly beyond the tradition of
representationalism, relies on words themselves to
communicate meaning, rather than on their referential
function. For him, then, words are not media through which
meaning is communicated; they are themselves the
communication. This was his poetic ideal: To write words of
such dazzling immediacy that their significance lies in
themselves and in their placement in the text, not beyond
themselves or outside of the text. Now this immediacy is
importantly different from the instantaneousness, which
Lyotard claims is demanded of a judgment on a painting such
as Newman's where it is not the immediacy (the continuity of
the text and the interpreter such that no process of translation
between them is necessary) of the communication which is at
stake but its momentary and non-relational character. Aspects
of Newman's paintings do not derive their meaning from within
the whole of which they are part; not only would this be very
difficult to achieve because they do not consist of many
identifiable parts, but to break them down in this manner
would be to repress the sublime feeling that they provoke
when encountered in an instant, all at once, as a single
response, a lived experience. Thus while Lyotard demands that
one judge of art instantaneously, without thinking, without
trying to formulate or make sense or interpret, Gadamer
insists that we judge of art immediately, by which he means
that we interpret, hypothesize and construe but only in a
specifically aesthetic context and not in the context of other
historical contingencies that lie outside of the text and impinge
upon its purity.
But the other answer is 'Yes. Gadamer does confuse his notion
of pré-jugé with the notion of avant-garde.' For if we are to do
now as Gadamer (and Lyotard) set out to do, which is to
derive from the experience of art a model of knowledge to
challenge the prevailing Kantian one, we are left, on
Gadamer's account of the lyric poem, with a rendition of
understanding that sits very uneasily with his declared
rehabilitation of prejudice, for now, it seems, though we must
continue to recognize objects and events (and ourselves)
within particular contexts, it is only the relevant aspects of
history that go to make up those contexts. Thus, though we
may always be prejudiced and never totally open, we are
always, it seems, prejudiced properly or relevantly, and are
not the radically compromised and historical creatures that
Gadamer had at first seemed to think us.
Though for Gadamer this implies that understanding is always
embedded in particular contexts, it also legitimizes the
abstraction of the text (the poem, for example) from various
levels of context or history from which it had initially seemed
we could not abstract our always prejudiced, always finite and
historical selves. And this abstraction of the understanding
that is supposedlypré-jugé from a whole series of contexts,
which can from the outset be determined as illegitimate
prejudices and therefore irrelevant to the experience of art
and to understanding generally, can be construed as a
function of Gadamer's confusion of the notion of avant-garde,
with its very close ties to the Kantian aesthetic and the
Enlightenment tradition with which it is imbued, and with his
own notion ofpré-jugé, which was to have called into question
rather than accepted the opposition between reason and
tradition with which Kant operated and which Lyotard admits
to perpetuating. For while he continues to insist, contra
Lyotard, that understanding is always embedded in particular
contexts or traditions, the importance of immediacy implies
that certain contexts or certain aspects of a context are from
the outset irrelevant for understanding to the extent that they
interpose themselves between the text and its interpreter and
upset the seamless continuity between them that is Gadamer's
ideal. And so, prior to any judgment but prior also to any pre-
judgment and therefore avant-garde, a certain level of our
finite situatedness is rendered aesthetically irrelevant and
understanding is preserved from a certain level of history.
5. Understanding without History: Aesthetic Abstraction
But in what does this certain level of aesthetically irrelevant
history consist? From what is the experience of understanding
aspré-jugé always already (avant-garde) abstracted? It is a
testimony to the extent to which Gadamer has, at this stage,
lost his way that both he and Lyotard agree in their respective
essays on the Kantian aesthetic, in spite of their explicitly
contrary agenda, about the three broad categories of history
from which understanding must be abstracted:
(i) First, it must be abstracted from the intellectual. The
exemplary experience of art is, on both Gadamer's and
Lyotard's account, to be had without the assistance of
intellectual concepts, categories or rules. Therefore both ,
continue Kant's determination to absolutely distinguish
between the judgments that we make on art and those that
constitute our knowledge. Now of course Gadamer and Lyotard
claim that Kant was too narrow in restricting the title of
'knowledge' to categorical judgments and that purely aesthetic
(i.e., non-categorical) judgments must also (or instead,
according to Lyotard) be granted a certain validity as
'knowledge.' But this in itself does nothing to challenge the
basic opposition between thinking and feeling that Kant
established. Hence, just as Lyotard maintains that in order to
leave oneself open to the sublime experience available in art
one must destroy all the forms of thought that would direct
one from the outset in this way and not another, just as he
argues that thought must be "disarmed"[24] in order to feel
avant-garde, so also Gadamer identifies a rigorous divide
between the intellectual categories of an "aesthetic
consciousness" and the openness of a "historical
consciousness," refusing from the outset to entertain the
various prejudices of an intellectual response to the aesthetic
in favor of the allegedly greater freedom available to the one
who would experience the art work without being directed to
look for particular styles, patterns, motifs, and so on. The art
work, he says, is related to an ultimate meaning 'that could
not be recuperated in intellectual terms,'[25] and so, from a
position that had appeared only to want to temper the role of
the purely intellectual/rational with an acknowledgment of the
contingency and partiality of all its categories, Gadamer has
arrived at a position for which those categories, by their very
nature, are irrelevant and distorting.
(ii) Second, aesthetic experience must be abstracted from the
everyday Gadamer uses the notion of 'aesthetic
nondifferentiation'[26] to justify this further abstraction. One
of the questions with which he is concerned in his essay on the
beautiful is the question of the identity of art through time.
How is it that we speak of the same work through its centuries
of interpretation, if interpretation, as he claims, is so
thoroughly steeped in historical circumstance as to make such
a guarantee of identity appear very precarious? The answer he
provides is once again that the kind of historical circumstances
that are relevant for the interpretation of an art work are not
to be confused with a certain level of historical circumstance -
what he calls the "pragmatic contexts of everyday life"[27] -
that, if admitted, might threaten the continuity of the work
and its interpretation through time. Thus for Gadamer, the
particular life experiences of the interpreter, her social class,
race, gender, hopes, expectations, purposes and so on,
remain irrelevant for the activity of interpretation, just as the
conditions of a performance, the tone of a specific reading, the
quality of an actor's rendition, the insights of a particular
direction, and so on, must also be taken out of
consideration.[28] From both sides of the aesthetic
experience, as it were, from the situation of the 'text' and
from the context of its interpreter, a whole plethora of
historical conditions are barred whose radical contingency
Gadamer cannot countenance, in spite of his declared
rehabilitation of history and tradition, in the context of his
desire to retain, above all, the continuity of a work through
time. In this he is also like Lyotard, though the latter performs
a similar abstraction from the "everyday or "ontic" level of
history for the sake of an opposed agenda to Gadamer's
preservation of continuity at all costs. For Lyotard, the most
significant aspect of the historical for an understanding that
proceeds on the back of sublime moments in which meaning
is, for a time, suspended, is not the series of contingent events
that might appear to serve his purpose of disrupting
expectations and interrupting the forms of thought, but a far
more radical, much more unfamiliar event - an event like
Auschwitz - than the nondescript circumstances which go to
make up our everyday existence.[29]
(iii) Third, the experience of art must be abstracted from
tradition or community We are familiar with the definition of
the artist as the solitary figure, creating outside of the bounds
of his tradition in order to fulfill the requirement for innovation
with which the modern artist was burdened. Lyotard avails of
this familiar account for his own purposes, construing the artist
of the avant-garde as a radicalization of this mythical
aloneness: Artists of the avant-garde, in his view, operate
beyond the bounds of the familiar; they produce art works
that can only shock because their refusal to parry to
recognizable forms and traditional motifs makes it impossible
to feel anything else. Such artists, he holds, are guided not by
their own culture but by an inspiration that comes to them
from nowhere.[30] But Gadamer too, in spite of his declared
commitment to tradition, ends in abstracting the artist from
his community in order to complete the process of aesthetic
non-differentiation that will, we presume, ensure that
Shakespeare will always be considered a great artist, his
greatness having nothing at all to do with his own historical
nature as embedded within a community or tradition whose
styles and values may not (indeed do not) translate across all
contexts and times. And in place of the community that he
"loses" when he begins to create, Gadamer posits for him a
truly universal community that extends to the whole
world.[31] Strong echoes here of the Kantian faculty of taste,
in which one is guided neither by intellectual criteria nor by
fashionable trends but by a sense or feel for what is truly
universal in the experience that one undergoes. But this
aspect of Kantian taste, its justification in terms of an
ahistorical faculty with universal extension, is precisely the
aspect that Gadamer's account of judgment aspré-jugé was
designed to depose. In the end, he seems unable to reconcile
his initial intentions with a persistent and very Enlightenment
tendency to establish the continuity or contemporaneity of
past and present by making art into the site for an
"overcoming of time."[32]
On the strength of such aesthetic abstractions from the
intellectual, the everyday and community or culture, Lyotard
leaves us with an account of understanding as a series of
infinitely simple rather than partial and historical events that
cannot be reconciled into any particular historical narrative
without inevitable damage or terror; and Gadamer leaves us
with an account of understanding as a continuous series of
unmediated and truly aesthetic rather than partial and
historical experiences that are determined within certain
appropriate concepts and contexts and therefore reconciled in
an appropriately aesthetic tradition. Thus Lyotard's account of
art gives us Erlebnis without reconciliation (history in its purest
and simplest form as flux), and Gadamer's account of art
gives us Erfahrung without contingency (history in its truest,
most lasting, form as invariance). But now Kant's opposition of
the manifold given to intuition and the categories given to the
understanding - the very division that led him into the problem
of purity that Gadamer and Lyotard claim to have rejected - is
curiously reproduced in the combined responses of Gadamer
and Lyotard to the emergent "problem" of history and truth.
6. Conclusion
This "problem" of truth under historical conditions emerged, as
we have seen, from Gadamer's and Lyotard's sustained
rejection of a problem that bedevilled the Enlightenment
tradition before it: the Kantian conundrum of how to identify
pure foundational criteria, loose enough to provide for the kind
of diversity typical of our aesthetic tastes and yet sufficiently
universal and necessary to guarantee that such tastes must be
imputed to anyone anywhere who has any pretensions to
making them part of the rational community. So Kant himself
was alive to the issue that I and Gadamer and Lyotard are
concerned with: the problem of overcoming the apparent
divide between history as manifold (an out and out flux in
which only difference and claims relative to difference obtain)
and history as synthesis (an invariant system over which
certain absolute categories always prevail). By explicitly
rejecting the alleged purity of both these versions of history
(as flux and invariance), Gadamer and Lyotard are still left
with an emergent version of it: the problem of judgment under
historical conditions. It is my contention, however, that neither
Gadamer nor Lyotard really do reject the purity of Kantian
history. Nevertheless, both provide a very useful commentary
on the efforts of the other, and both together yield, for my
purposes, a productive illumination of the nature of the
problem as a whole.
In Gadamer's account of effective history and in his
commitment to tradition and prejudice, for instance, there is
much that acts as an antidote to Lyotard's still too-
Enlightenment account of experience as Erlebnis. For instance,
Lyotard offers a description of Cézanne as an artist of the
avant-garde, creating on the strength of a purely sublime
impulse that behind art there is the founding possibility that
nothing more will happen. Cézanne, Lyotard maintains, worked
in order to reduce our experience of color to instantaneous
sensations, in other words to the bits that make up all and
every way of seeing. . He thereby cleanses the perceptual of
the "prejudices inscribed even in vision itself,"[33] Now the
description of Cézanne as an innovative artist of color is all
very well, Gadamer would reply, but the tendency to construe
him as therefore avant-garde is really unsustainable, not only
because, as Lyotard implies in his own writings, Cézanne
makes part of a very specific tradition that, coming in the
wake of the Enlightenment enthusiasm for
representationalism, seeks to question the presuppositions of
the tradition from which it has emerged, but also because in
order to engage in this line of questioning Cézanne refers us
to other traditions again: to the mask-making traditions of
Iberia and, as Gadamer shows, to the art of the high Middle
Ages, whose appearance as a text written in pictorial symbols
rather than a view as if from a window is now, after Cézanne,
able to be understood again.[34] Seen in this light, C�zanne's
innovation appears less an instance of judgment avant-garde
as judgmentpré-jugé, less a support of understanding-
as-Erlebnis than a demonstration that understanding-
as-Erfahrung is prior to any lived experience, any moment of
originality or genius.
But Lyotard's commitment to history as consisting in
instantaneous or different events is also useful as a corrective
to what we have now identified as Gadamer's too rigid
commitment to history as continuity. From instances such as
Cézanne's kinship with a tradition as far from his own as that
of the High Middle Ages, Gadamer concludes that there is an
overriding continuity between past and present, which is the
condition that makes understanding possible generally and is
most strikingly apparent in the domain of art. "[H]ow," he
asks, "can we find an all-embracing concept to cover both
what art is today and what it has been in the past?"[35] In
this context, however, Lyotard's very convincing work on the
radical shift that took place between the representational art
of the Enlightenment and the tradition of questioning
referentiality as an aesthetic value that continues to motivate
contemporary artists is an important remedy to Gadamer's
too-great reliance on the seamless continuity of history to
which he thinks the identity of art works, and of art itself,
succeeds in testifying to through time. For though it is the
case that Cézanne, in his response to representationalism in
art, both appeals to alternative traditions (Iberian mask
making, for instance) and enables us to interpret old traditions
(the High Middle Ages, for instance) in a new light, this is not
the equivalent to a proof of the continuity of history and
identity of art that Gadamer thinks it is. For as Lyotard's work
shows, very specific historical conditions contributed to the
possibility of Cubism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when certain items became possible as art works
that were not possible before. To derive from this an overall
continuity to art is to abstract too far from the discrete events
or prejudices that determine the experience of art at any given
time.
As for both Gadamer and Lyotard, however, their respective
choices of exemplary artwork - pure, lyric poetry and avant-
garde art - ironically illustrate the manner in which our
aesthetic judgments (which are evident as much in our
illustrative examples as anywhere else) do not operate avant-
garde (without prejudice) but are, as Gadamer begins by
saying,pré-jugé. Lyotard takes as paradigmatic of the
aesthetic attitude per se the kind of constant testifying to the
incommensurability between thought and the real world that
carries its impetus only in the context of a prevailing Kantian
tradition for which propositional logic and its aesthetic poor-
cousin, representational art, take precedence. Far from
operating avant-garde, then, Lyotard's aesthetic and the
artists it favors have a coherent, identifiable agenda at stake,
one with deeply historical relevance and, for that reason, with
merely historical and not pure significance.
In his essay, "The Sublime is Now," Lyotard's favored artist,
Newman, declares that his work is a direct reaction against the
notion that art emerges from within a tradition, that art
produces beautiful accommodations with its tradition. "We are
creating," he claims, "images whose reality is self-evident and
which are devoid of the props and crutches that evoke
associations with outmoded images. . . .We are freeing
ourselves," he continues, in open acknowledgment of the
agenda that is, after all, at stake in his work, 'of the
impediments of memory, association, nostalgia, legend, myth,
or what have you, that have been the devices of Western
European painting. . . .The image we produce is the self-
evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be
understood by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic
glasses of history."[36] Likewise, Gadamer's choice of
Mallarmé's "pure poetry" as illustrative of the features
essential to art and to the continuity that he demands of the
aesthetic in fact merely isolates a particular contemporary art
form whose significance too is derived from the Enlightenment
tradition of representationalism in art and the dominance of
propositional knowledge from which it is derived. According to
a recent translator of Mallarmé's verse, Mallarmé's esoteric use
of language was motivated by an enduring personal
commitment to what was, for him, a Classical project of
transcending the constraints of representationalism in pursuit
of throwing light on everlasting, ahistorical truths. "Mallarmé is
often obscure," Weinfield admits, "but he is no obscurantist;
his obscurity and difficulty are organic to, necessary
concomitants of, . . .the philosophical vision, the actual
content of his poetry: the quest for Beauty and for a
transcendent Ideal and the tragic vision on which that quest is
based."[37]
Thus while as historically influenced choices of art work to
undermine certain prevailing assumptions about art and
knowledge both Gadamer's and Lyotard's aesthetic tastes are
appropriately forceful and effective, as choices of allegedly
paradigmatic aesthetic features that demonstrate the
conditions for understanding as a universal experience they
are too prejudiced in favour of the projects to which they are
attached to be convincing. As Gadamer predicted, the
experience of understanding of which our aesthetic judgments
are exemplary is not avant-garde, butpré-jugé.
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